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INTRODUCTION
Research on problem solving offers insights into how humans process task-related information
and which strategies they use (Newell and Simon, 1972; Öllinger et al., 2014). Problem solving can
be defined as the search for possible changes in one’s mind (Kahneman, 2003). In a recent study,
Adams et al. (2021) assessed whether the predominant problem solving strategy when making
changes involves adding or subtracting elements. In order to do this, they used several examples of
simple problems, such as editing text or making visual patterns symmetrical, either in naturalistic
settings or on-line. The essence of the authors’ findings is a strong preference to add rather than
subtract elements across a diverse range of problems, including the stabilizing of artifacts, creating
symmetrical patterns, or editing texts. More specifically, they succeeded in demonstrating that
“participants were less likely to identify advantageous subtractive changes when the task did not
(vs. did) cue them to consider subtraction, when they had only one opportunity (vs. several) to
recognize the shortcomings of an additive search strategy or when they were under a higher (vs.
lower) cognitive load” (Adams et al., 2021, p. 258).
Addition and subtraction are generally defined as de-contextualized mathematical operations
using abstract symbols (Russell, 1903/1938). Nevertheless, understanding of both symbols and
operations is informed by everyday activities, such as making or breaking objects (Lakoff and
Núñez, 2000; Fischer and Shaki, 2018). The universal attribution of “addition bias” or “subtraction
neglect” to problem solving activities is perhaps a convenient shorthand but it overlooks
influential framing effects beyond those already acknowledged in the report and the accompanying
commentary (Meyvis and Yoon, 2021).
Most importantly, while Adams et al.’s study addresses an important issue, their very method of
verbally instructing participants, together with lack of control over several known biases, might
render their findings less than conclusive. Below, we discuss our concerns that emerged from
the identified biases, namely those regarding the instructions and the experimental materials.
Moreover, we refer to research frommathematical cognition that provides new insights into Adams
et al.’s findings.
BIAS FROM LANGUAGE-BASED INSTRUCTIONS
The first bias emerges from merely instructing participants to do something. This alone already
implies addition: With the exception of specific subtraction terms like “remove pieces,” any socially
embedded request to “make” or “do” (apart from specialized constructions like “make less of...”)
demands creating and thus adding. Language statistics reflect this language-immanent hortatory
bias, as the authors themselves demonstrate by regularly instructing their participants to “add
or subtract” but never to “subtract or add”. This ordering preference makes adding more salient
than subtracting. Moreover, in the control conditions of their first three experiments, the authors
explicitly mentioned addition (“each piece that you add costs ten cents”) but not subtraction.
In contrast, there was never an instruction in the control conditions that explicitly mentioned
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subtraction but not addition. This creates the context whereby
mentioning “addition” first creates bias toward adding, because
the first mentioned word is more salient (e.g., Zadeh, 1975).
Adams and colleagues’ instructions actually reflect a general
pattern of language use—there are 95 occurrences of “add
and subtract” but zero occurrences of “subtract and add” in
a representative English language corpus1. A distributional
semantic analysis of the verbs used in their instructions reveals
an additional dimension of bias: A Latent Semantic Analysis
(Deerwester et al., 1990) reveals that the supposedly neutral
terms “improve,” “arrange” and “change” are all more strongly
associated with “addition” (as indicated by similarity scores of
0.22, 0.33 and 0.22, respectively) thanwith subtraction (0.03, 0.14,
and 016, respectively.2
Overall, we believe that linguistic instruction, different from
other cognitive, cultural and socioecological factors already
considered by the authors and commentators, the language-
based nature of instruction constitutes a separate, more profound
and indeed overlooked source of bias. While the authors
documented differences between conditions that identified a
subtraction neglect, our linguistic argument draws attention to
the ignored baseline value of addition bias in the language.
The authors might argue that, when comparing a “no cue”
to a “with cue” condition, the added instructional cue “add and
subtract” should lead to more additions under our perspective
but instead resulted in more subtractions (in their Experiments
2–4). However, our “biased language argument” implies that the
“no cue” condition is actually not neutral and already contains
the “addition” bias. Thus, adding the instructional cue adds only
a single new element, namely “subtraction.” Consistent with
the semantic priming literature (e.g., Mandera et al., 2017), this
change draws attention and leads to the corresponding behavioral
compliance observed.
BIAS FROM STIMULUS DESIGN
The overall study by Adams and colleagues deserves strong
acknowledgment because a large number of demonstrations from
a variety of domains consistently points in the same direction,
suggesting that we neglect subtractions in favor of additions.
Nevertheless, it is also true that the power of this conclusion
depends on the strength of the individual component arguments.
We therefore point to several limitations of the current evidence
that are associated with the experimental materials used in the
study. For example, participants saw a LegoTM Tower that had on
its top a single lateralized stone that barely supported a flat roof.
Their task was to modify this construction to enable the secure
placement of a brick on top of the roof. The authors placed a
LegoTM figure in front of this tower construction (see Figure 2
of Adams et al., 2021). This figure will have drawn participants’
attention to the front of the tower, where only adding a block
was possible, thereby either signaling that the extra height of the
platform was not necessary, or perhaps reducing the probability
of subtracting the superfluous block in the back of the tower.
1https://www.english-corpora.org/coca/
2http://lsa.colorado.edu/
In another problem, participants were provided with a set of
four grids of 10 ×10 squares that were either white or green.
Their task was to make the green area symmetrical by toggling
green squares to white or white squares to green per mouse
click. Importantly, all four toggle grids initially contained more
white than green fields (first grid; 73 white vs. 27 green squares;
second: 54 vs. 46; third: 68 vs. 32; fourth 56 vs. 44). Thus, the
authors implemented 63% white and 37% green squares; this
design feature biased performance against subtraction because
there were already more white squares (see Figure 1 of Adams
et al., 2021). Importantly, the entire argument hinges on what is
perceived to be the figure and what is perceived to be the ground
because, in principle, a toggle operation is neither adding nor
subtracting anything unless a target or a figure object has been
defined. Aside from themere frequency advantage that makes the
green pattern the figure, it remains unclear whether each entire
grid was placed against a white background (just as it appears in
the printed article). Although this criticism does not account for
the effect of cognitive load (which magnified subtraction neglect)
an interesting prediction is that, on a green page, the opposite
preference might emerge for the same patterns.
INSIGHTS FROM MATHEMATICAL
COGNITION RESEARCH
Third, Adams et al. (2021) reported participants’ sensitivity to
instruction manipulations. This insight converges with findings
obtained from mathematical cognition research. To begin with,
arithmetic operations are spatially associated: the widely spread
population stereotypes have addition associated with right/up,
while subtraction is associated with left/down (Winter et al.,
2015). Adams et al.’s materials were not controlled for these
pre-experimentally existing associations. One example is the
golf hole depiction used to elicit modifications (see Figure 3
in Adams et al., 2021). The picture implies progression toward
the upper right corner, thus inviting addition as the preferred
associated response.
Furthermore, a key requirement for fair cognitive comparison
of arithmetic operations is results-matching (Shaki et al., 2018).
Empirical aesthetics has found that people have a preference
for more complex as opposed to simple arrangements (Kaplan
et al., 1972; Jacobsen andHöfel, 2002), making it problematic that
all “addition” outcomes in the Adams et al. (2021) report were
visually more complex than “subtraction” outcomes. Evaluating
arithmetic preferences in a purelymathematical task that requires
participants to create arithmetic addition or subtraction facts
from visually presented components (operands, operators, and
results) could be used to avoid this complexity confound. This is
illustrated in the study by Werner et al. (2019), which revealed
no addition bias but confirmed the well-known sensitivity of
operation choices to spatial cues.
FUTURE STUDIES
In order to clarify the issue of whether there is indeed a
“subtraction neglect” or an “addition bias” in human problem
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solving, we suggest improvements to the experimental design of
future studies in the two following ways.
Firstly, the experimental tasks can be improved by
counterbalancing instructions and stimuli design. So, future
studies should use both addition-biasing and subtraction-biasing
instructions (and not just bias toward addition). One needs to
be careful to create instructions that are not implicitly biasing
toward addition, as could be assessed via Latent Semantic
Analysis (as demonstrated above). Furthermore, presented
stimuli should be extended by pictures that lead to “promoting”
subtraction as well (for instance a golf hole that is directed
from the top right to the bottom left). Finally, stimuli’s visual
complexity should be controlled by using novel versions of the
two-dimensional toggle grids.
Secondly, we recommend investigating “addition bias” within
a simpler domain first. Note that in the reported studies,
processing domains were mixed; i.e., they required processing
of complex shapes (2-dimensional grids), schema-like objects
(golf hole), and three-dimensional objects (LegoTM tower) as well
as mental addition- and subtraction-like processes. Instead, we
suggest leaving out complex stimuli and using a simple, one-
dimensional task. A concrete experiment could consist of a line-
modification task where participants are given counterbalanced
instructions either to make asymmetrically divided lines
symmetrical or symmetrically divided lines asymmetrical—either
by adding or subtracting (subtracting or adding) elements to
either side of the line. Such tasks would neither be confounded by
cross-domain associations nor by the complexity of experimental
materials. In contrast to the experiments reported in Adams et al.
(2021), different spatial dimensions should be assessed separately
(horizontal, vertical, sagittal). Also, spatial alignment of the line
itself (asymmetrical to the left/to the right) should be controlled
to eliminate task-induced spatial biases.
To summarize our commentary, we believe that a baseline
distorted by using biased instructions, spatially unbalanced
materials and procedures, as well as comparing across
differentially complex outcomes considerably weakens the
conclusions suggested by Adams et al. (2021). On the other hand,
the bulk of converging evidence from conceptual replications
and the direction of effects in favor of addition over subtraction
is intriguing and we are grateful for their thought-provoking
study that promotes deeper insights into the nature of our
problem solving minds.
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